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iWORLD MARKET CONDITIONS FOR Glk41NS: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*
Martin E. Abel**
Department of Agricultural and Applied Ecanomics
University of Minnesota
I. Introduction
The dramatic changes in world grain prices since 1972 have raised
serious questions about the level and stability of future grain prices.
mile all countries are concerned with these questions, they are especially
important to a large number of developing countries. Some developing coun-
tries are important grain exporters, and future world market ccmditions bear
directly on prospects for foreign exchange earnings and the ability of these
nations to finance development. Many other developing countries are net
grain importers. The behavior of grain prices in the future will have much
to do with the ability of these countries to import grain, insure domestic
food price stability, and protect the nutritional well-being of large seg-
ments of the population.
There is a good chance that world market conditions for grains during
the next five to ten years will be highly uncertain, compared with conditions
that prevailed in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This paper focuses on the policy
*This paper was prepared at the request of the Economic and Sector
Analysis Division, Technical Assistance Bureau, Agency for International
Development.
**I would like to thank James P. Houck and Willard W. Cochrane for
their helpful advice and suggestions.
12
options that may be open to countries, individually or collectively, for
dealing with uncertain market conditions. We first discuss the evolution
of the current world market situation for grains, the patterns of inter-
national trade in grains, and the basic problems that the current situa-
tion generates for different types of countries. Next, we look at the
future prospects for grain production, consumption, and trade and then
examine the policy options for dealing with the future. Finally, we look
at alternative mechanisms for implementing a variety of policy options.
Our focus is on grains because these represent the basic category of
food, worldwide, and are the most important form in which food is trans-
ferred among countries.
11, The Current Situation and Its Origins
A. Evolution of the Current Situation
Once again the spectre of a Malthusian catastrophe has captured the
headlines. The relatively tight food situation since 1972 is the sixth
time in the last two centuries that there has been widespread concern about
1/ food shortages and famine.–
The world food situation in the 1950’s and 1960’s was reasonably com-
fortable. There was excess production capacity in the developed countries
reflected in combinations of surplus stocks of grain and land withheld from
&/seemrtin E* Abel “Food Production Possibilities in the High-Food-
Drain Economies,” America; Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50,
No. 5, December 1968, pp. 1273-82, for a brief historical review. During
this same period there were numerous, localized famines, some of consider-
able magnitude. These were generally considered to be isolated, transitory
events and did not influence global views about the growth of food supplies
relative to the growth of the demand for food.production under governmental programs. Food production in the less
developed countrieq kept slightly ahead of population growth. The increased
production in the less developed countries together with increased grain
imports, a significant portion of it being food aid, resulted in a modest
but fairly steady increase in average levels of per capita food consumption
in the less developed countries. Except for the severe droughts in South
Asia during 1965 and 1966, the world food situation




in 1970, the world food situation
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Canada were reduced





the grain production and stocks in
as a matter of government policy.
in Australia. The demand for grain
continued to grow at rapid and predictable rates in the industrialized
countries. However, the sudden emergence of the USSR in 1972 as a massive
purchaser of grain was not predictable. Soviet grain purchases placed
great stress on existing grain supplies and reduced reserve stocks to
extremely low levels, “setting off the greatest price boom, first in grains
“2’ (Tables 1-3.) and then in animal products, in modern times. —
As Cochrane states:
The general surplus condition in the grains which existed
in 1970 was gone by the summer of 1972. Depending upon the
point of view, the world was, in June 1972: (a) in an economic
balance with regard to grain production and utilization; or
2/ — Willard W. Cochrane, Feast or Famine: The Uncertain World of hod
and Agriculture and Its Policy Implications for the United States, National
Planning Association, Washington, D. C., February 1974, p. 2. This refer-
ence also contains an excellent summary of the numerous specific forces
that gave rise to the price boom of 1972.4
Table 1. World Prices of Wheat, Corn, and Rice, 1955-74




















































































—~Canadian Export Price: No. 1 Northern through July 1971;
from Aug. 1971, Canadian Western Red Spring; through July
1973, 14% protein; from Aug. 1973, 13.5% protein; export
price through July 1969 - Canadian Wheat Board selling
price (class II); from Aug. 1969 export price according
to International Grain Agreement; through May 1970, basis
in store Fort William - Port Arthur; from June 1970, basis
in store, Thunder Bay 1955-1972, FAO Production Yearbook,
1968, 1973, 1973-74 FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 24, Feb. 1975.
lyu ~ ~mport price
.* : U.S. yellow, nearest forward shipment
C.I.F. through 1962, No. 2, from 1963, No. 3, from 1968
resellers 1955-1972 FAO Production Yearbook 1967, 1972, 1973,
1973-74 FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 24, Feb. 1975.
“Thailand Export Price: white, government standards, F.O.B.;
th~ough 1969, 5-7% brokens, from 1970 - 5%, 1955-1972 FAO
Production Yearbook, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1973-74 FAO Monthly
Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Vol. 24,
Feb. 1975.Table 2. Reserve Stocks of Wheat, by Country, 1960-73






















































































Table 3. Reserve Stocks of Coarse Grains, by Country, 1960-73




































































































(b) teetering on a razor’s edge with respect to surplus or
shortage, feast or famine.~/
The “economic balance” or “razor’s edge” in grains has prevailed into 1976
and is likely to continue into the near future. Poor weather in various
places, including the United States in 1974, has prevented world grain pro-
duction from increasing faster than demand and either reducing prices or
allowing grain stocks to be rebuilt in any significant amount.
In addition, the costs of agricultural inputs have risen significantly.
The rise in input prices has been due partly to the sharp rise in petroleum
products, which sharply escalated the price of fuel and nitrogen fertili-
zers, and partly to inflation, which has been widespread.
The price boom in agricultural commodities in the early 1970’s repre-
sented a substantial increase in real prices. There are powerful forces
at work to increase further the nominal prices of food in world markets.
The demand for food will continue to grow as a result of increasing popu-
lation and rising per capita income. Continued general inflation and
increases in prices of key agricultural inputs, such as for fuel and fer-
tilizer, will work towards increasing production costs and product prices.
Bringing additional land into production can be done profitably only at
higher product prices because of the substantial investments required and
the lower productivity of the additional land. It appears that only an
accelerated rate of technological advance would dampen increases in nominal
4/ prices and ensure that the real price of food does not continue to rise.—
ylbid p *
l Y**
4/ – This assessment assumes that climatic conditions remain normal. If,
as some climatologists are predicting, there is a rapid deterioration in
climatic conditions, food production could be adversely affected and food
prices could soar.7
It is useful to consider some of the basic, long-term changes that
have taken place on the world food and agricultural scene as they relate
to the world food situation.
One important change has been the humanitarian revolution, largely
a post-World War 11 development, which resulted in large groups of people
feeling some obligation for the welfare of other peoples. As a minimum,
starvation on a large scale has become morally intolerable. Thus, we
observe the fairly new phenomenon that people who face starvation because
of acts of nature such as drought, earthquakes, pests, etc., and because
of acts of man against man, such as war, have a rightful claim on the
world’s food supplies. Furthermore, this universal humanitarian revolu-
tion has succeeded, as it should, in divorcing food needs from effective
purchasing power. In this respect, there is an element of worldwide food
needs that is relatively insensitive to food prices and national purchasing
poweT as the mechanisms for allocating food supplies.
A second change In the world food picture has been the rapid acceler-
ation in rates of population growth, especially in the developing countries,
which occurred in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Annual rates of population growth
in the range of 2.5 to 3,5 percent are now commonplace. The increased rates
of population growth reflect substantial declines in death rates brought
about by successful, large-scale public health programs, and improved
systems of food distribution.
Another important dimension of the world food situation is the rapid
growth of incomes in the developed countries and in an increasing number
of less developed countries, which has resulted in a rapid expansion of
(a) demand for agricultural products and (b) agricultural trade. The rapid8
rates of growth in incomes are in part due to a growing rationalization of
trade and production policies and are not, therefore, a comp~etaly exogonou~
factor in explaining the growth in world agricultural trade. Even though
growth in trade based on growth in income and population, particularly in
the developed countries, is predictable with a reasonable degree of accuracy,
the results, nevertheless, can be spectacular. For example, U.S. agri-
cultural exports to Japan increased from $1.2 billion in 1969 to
5/
in 1974.–
A fourth change is the recent slowing of the rate of growth




1960’s food production in a number of developing countries received a sig-
nificant fillip from the introduction of the new high-yielding varieties
of wheat and rice. The adoption of these new varieties was especially
rapid in those areas where there were adequate water supplies> abundant
fertilizer, and favorable prices. @ce this production potential was
6/
exploited, the rate of adoption of the new varieties slowed.— Their
further spread will be conditioned by the rates at which (a) the quantity
and quality of irrigation can be expanded, (b) the new varieties can be
adapted to local conditions, (c) fertilizer supplies can be increased,
and (d) product-input price relations can be improved.
Finally, an important, but not fully appreciated, change in the world
food picture is the decision by a large number of countries to rely on
“Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., June 1975.
6/ — Dana G. Dalrymple, Development and Spread of High-Yielding Varieties
of Wheat and Rice in the Less Developed Nations, Foreign Agricultural
Economic Report No. 95, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Washington, D. C., July 1974.world markets for their food supplies beyond what can be explained merely
by growth in income and population. These are decisions which move coun-
tries, sometimes suddenly, away from autarchic national agricultural poli-
cies toward graater reliance on international trade. It is not always
clear whether these moves are for rational economic reasons which recognize
the benefits of trade, or for domestic and international political reasons.
But even though we may not be sure of the motives, the impact on the world
food situation is clear and sometimes very pronounced. The entry in a big
way of the Soviet Union into world grain markets in 1972 illustrates this
point. One can find numerous other, though less dramatic, instances where
the decisions of countries to follow less autarchic agricultural and gen-
eral economic policies have had a sudden impact on the demand for food in
7/ world markets.—
Each of these changes in
interdependence among nations
the world food scene has resulted in a greater
with respect to food supplies and food prices.
It has become increasingly difficult for countries to insulate their food
positions from events in other countries.
Some major chaqges in the demand for and supply of food occur on a
systematic basis and can be predicted with a considerable degree of cer-
tainty. The systematic changes are generally not overly disruptive of the
world food situation. Among the main forces producing regular growth are
income and population on the demand side and sustained productivity growth
on the supply side. But many other large changes--those resulting from
7/ – For example, the decisions of both Taiwan and Korea to increase
livestock production on the basis of a modern feed industry led to rapid
and historically discontinuous increases in feed grain imports during the
1960’s and 1970’s.10
national calamities or sudden changes in economic policies--are unpredict-
able and can cause serious dislocation in the world picture. Thus, the
benefits to be derived from expanded and, hopefully, more economically
rational trade can be accompanied by greater uncertainties concerning supply,
demand, and the price of food in world markets, unless random fluctuations
are offset or reserve stocks of commodities exist to cushion the price
effects of unpredicted changes in supply or demand.
Until quite recently, variations in world food prices have been kept
within reasonable limits. This has been due in large measure to the
ability of the United States ‘toexpand agricultural production and to
mamtain large food reserves in the 1950’s and 1960’s. These reserves were
in the form of grain stocks or idle production capacity. The ability to
draw on these stocks and reserve production capacity enabled the United
States to meet unpredictable food shortages and to maintain a reasonable
degree of price stability in domestic and world markets.
The demand for grains tends to be highly price inelastic; i.e. a
given percentage change in supplies results in a much larger percentage
change in price. When the supply of grain is quite elastic and does not
fluctuate much, as was the case when large grain reserves existed, market
prices can remain quite stable. However, in the absence of reserves, an
inelastic and fluctuating supply can cause large price swings. The latter
situation has prevailed in world markets since 1973.
In summary, the current world food situation, conditioned by economic
and demographic forces; national and international food, agricultural, and
trade policies; and natural forces, namely unfavorable weather, can be









The demand for food continues to increase at a fairly rapid pace
primarily because of growth in incomes @ the industrial and more
rapidly developing less developed countries and continued, rapid
rates of population growth in most less developed countries.
Food production has been unstable and has not kept pace with the
growth in demand because of unfavorable weather condition~’ in
various parts of the world and uneven rates of technological advance.
Reserve stocks of food (grains) have been depleted and currently
there does not exist a buffer against instability in production.
Major areas of the world are more dependent than ever on world
markets as a means of achieving their food and agricultural
policy goals.
Nominal world food prices are high
standards, and there is a distinct
real food prices might continue to
and unstable, by historical
possibility that nominal and
rise for at least several years.
This possibility results from an unstable supply of grain inter-
acting with a growing, but very price inelastic demand for grain.
For developed countries, high and unstable food prices have contrib-
uted to inflation and instability in the overall level of prices.
For less developed countries that are net food exporters, high
food prices have made a positive contribution to foreign exchange
earnings and have helped to offset increased prices of nonagricult-
ural imports, particularly petroleum.
In the case of less developed countries that are net food importers,
8/
– Examples in 1975 are the USSR, Western Europe, and substantial parts
of the corn belt of the United States.12
the current food situation has aggravated seriously the shortage
of foreign exchange and has pushed up domestic food prices as
well. These developments have led to deterioration in the aver-
age diets in many of the poorer nations.
B. International Grain Production and Marketing Patterns
In this section we look at the changes in production and trade of
grams among countries or regions of the world between 1958 and 1972. The
data for these years are three-year averages for the periods 1957-59 and
1971-73, respectively.
Total world grain production increased by 51 percent over the period
1958 to 1972 (table 4). The increases in total world production of wheat,
coarse grains, and rice were 51, 60 and 31 percent, respectively. Thus,
coarse grains gained and rice lost in relative importance in world production.
In the developed countries, total grain production increased by 42 per-
cent, wheat by 40 percent, coarse grains by 44 percent, and rice by 12 per-
cent. In the centrally planned countries total grain production increased by
53 percent, wheat by 48 percent, coarse grains by 90 percent, and rice by
9 percent. With respect to the developing countries, total grain production
increased by 63 percent, wheat by 83 percent, coarse grains by 58 percent, and
rice by 56 percent. Overall, grain production increased at a faster rate in
the developing than in either the developed or centrally planned countries.
Changes in the levels and distribution of grain trade among countries
(table 5) follow considerably different patterns than those for production.
These differences are accounted for by differences in rates of growth in
population and income, and in trade policies. Between 1958 and 1972 the
developed countries became the major exporters of grain while the developing13
Table 4. Production of Wheat, Coarse Grains, and Rice, by Country






































































































































































































Source: FAO Production Yearbooks, 1960 and 1973.14
Table 5. Net Trade in Wheat and Flour, Coarse Grains, and Rice, by Country


















































































































































































































Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks, 1960 and 1973.15
and centrally planned countries became major importers. However, there was
considerable variation among groups of countries with respect to the dif-
ferent types of grain.
Total wheat exports increased by about 70 percent, from 29.3 to 49.7
million metric tons. The major wheat exporting countries are the United
States, Canada, Australia? and Argentina. The Soviet Union switched from
being an exporter of wheat in 1958 to an importer m 1972.
All the other countries or regions were net importers of wheat. Among
Che developed country importers, only Japan increased imports significantly.
The centrally planned countries went from a negligible level of net imports
in 1958 to 13.2 million metric tons in 1972. All the developing countries
or regions, except Argentina, were net importers of wheat, and total imports
by these countries increased from 9.2 to 26.8 million metric tons, or by
nearly 200 percent.
The situation for world trade in coarse grains is quite different than
that for wheat. The major exporters in 1972 were the United States (with
63 percent of total exports), Canada, South Africa, Australia, Argentina, and
Thailand in Southeast Asia. Brazil and East Africa exported small amounts
of coarse grains. The major importers were the western European countries,
Japan, and the centrally planned countries. The developing countries other
than those mentioned above accounted for a small part of world trade in
coarse grains. Clearly, the bulk of world trade in coarse grains is among
developed and centrally planned countries. This reflects the high income
levels of these nations and concomitant levels or growth of livestock con-
sumption.
World trade in rice is small by comparison with either wheat or coarse
grains. Further, the growth in world trade of rice has been slower than16
that for the other two classes of grain. The major rice exporters are China,
Southeast Asia, and the United States. Several other regions of the world
have small amounts of rice exports. (Exports from Japan in 1972 represent
a temporary situation in which surplus stocks of rice were being disposed
of on world markets.) Numerous countries or regions are net importers of
rice, the largest being East Asia, centrally planned other Asia, Central
Africa, and the Middle East.
c. Trading Systems and Agricultural Policies
The structure of world trade in grains--distribution among countries,
and the level and stability of prices--is strongly conditioned by the effects
of different types of trading systems and agricultural policies.
Many developed countries have maintained domestic prices above world
levels in order to provide price and income protection for producers.~’ Such
protective agricultural policies cost consumers substantial amounts in the
form of higher food prices and inefficient allocations of resources in agri-
cultural production. They may also have substantial drains on national
treasuries.
One effect of protectionistic policies is to depress world market
prices. Countries reduce their imports by maintaining excess resources in
grain production. The EEC-9 is a case in point. By using protectionistic
“For more detailed discussions of this point, see Agricultural Policies
in 1966: Europe, North America, Japan, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Paris, 1967; D. Gale Johnson, World Agriculture in Disarray
(London: Fontana, 1973); D. Gale Johnson and John A. Schnittker, eds., U.S.
Agriculture in a World Context: Policies and Approaches for the Next Decade
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974); A Future for European Agriculture, The
Atlantic Papers No. 4, The Atlantic Institute, Paris, 1970; and John S.
Marsh, European Agriculture in an Uncertain World, The Atlantic Institute,
Paris, 1975.17
policies it has reduced its annual average net imports of total grains from
17.3 milkl.onmetric tons in the 1957-59 period to 14.5 million metric tons
in the 1971-73 period, or by 16 percent. Meanwhile, EEC-9 production
increased from 63.2 to $01.3 million metric tons or by 60 percent.
The disparity betwetm agricultural prices in the EEC (the original 6
members) and world markets is illustrated in table 6 for 1966/67. These
data reflect market conditions which prevailed throughout the 1960’s and
early 1970’s; i.e., prior tp the surge in world agricultural prices that
occurred after 1972. For grains, the extent to which EEC prices were above
world prices ranged from 17 percent for rice to 185 percent for soft wheat.
The EEC countries are not the only ones that maintain high agricultural
prices. The data on producer pr#.cesfor wheat presented in table 7 illus-
trate the extent of agricultural price supports and the wide range in price
levels. The producer price of wheat in 1968/69 ranged from less than U.S.
$4 per 100 kg. in Argentina to over $14 in Finland, Japan, Norway, and
Switzerland. A $im$lar pattern holds for many other commodities.
Among the developed countries, reduced imports by net importing coun-
tries placed downward pressure on the demand for exports. This meant that
prices received by producers and production were depressed in those coun-
tries that did not insulate their domestic markets from the world market.
Those developed exporting countries that did insulate domestic markets, such
as the United States, were faced either with an accumulation of surpluses or
the need to purposely withhold resources, mainly land, from production.
There have been three “safety valves” for the excess production in the
developed exporting countries; one was subsidized food consumption for the
domestic poor, another was food aid to the less developed countries, and18
Table 6. European Economic Community and World
Prices for Agricultural Commodities, 1966/67
EEC price




































































Source: G. R. Kruer and B. Bernston, “Cost of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy of the European Economic Community,” Foreign
Agricultural Trade of the United States, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Washington, D. C., 1969.19
Table 7. Producer prices for farm products, 1968 or 1968/69,
U.S. $ per 100 kg.
Wheat Whole milk
$4 or less Argentina
4-6 Canada
6-8 Denmark, U.K., U.S.A.
8-10 Ireland, Greece, Sweden,
Austria, Spain, Turkey,
France, Netherlands
10-12 Italy, Portugal, USSR
12-14
Over 14 Finland, Japan? Norway,
Switzerland
Source: Compiled by D. Gale Johnson, World Agriculture in
Disarray (London: Fontana, 1973), pp. 56-57.
a third was export subsidies. The latter two measures worked also to depress
world grain prices,
The depressing influence on world market prices of protectionistic agri-
cultural policies in the developed countries has had serious repercussions
for the less developed countries, all leading, in general to reduced incen-
tives to develop agriculture and increase agricultural output at faster
rates.Q/ Those developing countries bent on keeping domestic consumer
prices low were able to do so as a result of relatively low world prices and
“l?or a detailed discussion of the effects of U.S. agricultural
policies on less developed countries see Martin E. Abel, “The Developing
Countries and U.S. Agriculture,” in D. Gale Johnson and John A. Schnittker,
eds., U.S. Agriculture in World Context: Policies and Approaches for the
Next Decade (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 138-181.20
a ready supply of food aid. In the process, producer prices were also
kept low and incentives to increase production were weakened by varying
degrees.=’ The situation was further compounded in those countries where
investments in agricultural development were neglected because of the per-
ception that there was an abundant supply of food at low prices available
in world markets.
Those developed countries that depend heavily on agricultural exports
for foreign exchange and development resources were also penalized. Incen-
tives to increase agricultural output and exports were weak, given the
levels of world prices and the limited export opportunities. And, the
foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports were also depressed,
thereby limiting the resources available to finance development.
As already mentioned, some developing countries made a relatively bad
situation worse by imposing their own domestic policies which worked against
“Some of the more pertinent literature on this subject includes
T. W. Schultz, “Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries,”
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLII, No. 5, December 1960,-pp. 1019-1036;
S. R. Sen, “Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Under-
developed Economies--The Indian Perspective,” Journal of Farm Economics,
Vol. XLII, No. 5, December 1960, pp. 1031-1042; Franklin M. Fischer, “A
Theoretical Analysis of the Impact-of Food Surplus Disposal on Agricultural
Production in Recipient Countries,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 45,
No. 4, November 1963, pp. 863-875; Jitendar S. Mann, “The Impact of Public
Law 480 Imports on Prices and Domestic Supply of Cereals in India,”
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1, Part I, February 1967, pp. 131-
146; Gary L. Seevers, “An Evaluation of the Disincentive Effect Caused by
P.L. 480 Shipments,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50,
No. 3, August 1968, pp. 630-642; Per Pinstrup-Anderson and Luther G. Tweeten,
“The Value, Cost, and Efficiency of American Food Aid,” American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, No. 3, August 1971, pp. 431-440; Peter
Greenston, The Food for Peace Program and Brazil: Valuation and the Effects
of the Commodity Inflow, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics,
University of Minnesota, 1972; and Leonard Dudley and Roger J. Sandilands,
“The Side Effects of Foreign Aid: The Case of Public Law 480 Wheat in
Colombia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 23, No. 2,
January 1975, pp. 325-336.21
agricultural development. On the other hand, some other countries did well
in spite of world market conditions by emphasizing agricultural development
and, in some cases, emphasizing production of those agricultural commodities
for which world demand has been growing rapidly, e.g., fruits, vegetables,
and beef.
Another important feature of world grain trade is the large and growing
importance of state trading. Countries with state trading systems may be
able to influence world market prices and the distribution of grain trade
among countries through control over the timing and amounts of purchases
or sales. This can be done by withholding information from world markets
about purchase or sales intentions.
State trading countries can be broken arbitrarily into two major
categories. In the first category, all buying, selling, handling, storing,
and shipping is done exclusively by the government. The centrally planned
countries belong to this category.
The second category cannot be described so succinctly. In many coun-
tries there exists a monopoly with sole responsibility for exports, imports,
or domestic distributi~n of one or more commodities of interest. The mon-
opoly agency may be a governmental organization, a purely producer group that
is granted monopoly power by government, or a mixture of the two. Commodities
under the control of the monopoly agencies also vary from just a few economi-
cally important ones co many traded commodities. Some of these monopoly
agencies may rely on the private sector for storage, transportation, and
other functions.
In Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board has a monopoly position in the
export of wheat and coarse grains. Australia has export monopolies for22
wheat and feed barley
control international
Board does in Canada.
where the Australian Wheat Board and the Barley Board
marketing in much the same way as the Canadian Wheat
In both Canada and Australia, the above mentioned
marketing boards are primarily producer-controlled organizations who have
been granted monopoly power by the respective governments, The only other
developed country with a marketing system of this type is Japan. The
Japanese Food Agency, a totally governmental agency, determines the import
quantities of wheat and feed barley.
In contrast to these two types of state trading countries are those
where trade is carried out by the private sector with many private export
and import firms allowed to trade. Generally, the governments use only
indirect controls such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies to achieve policy
goals. Examples of this type of trading system
Europe.
The developing countries have a mixture of
are the United States and
trading systems. The large
number of developing countries and the great diversity of trading systems
that exist among them make it difficult to generalize about the importance
of state trading in this group of countries. Therefore,
rest of our discussion on s~ate trading in the centrally
developed countries.
The changing share of world trade for state trading
we will focus the
planned and
countries is cal-
culated on the basis of gross trade; i.e., imports plus exports. This iS
a measure of the gross movement of commodities into and out of a country. It
enables us to handle conveniently the problem of a country such as the Soviet
Union switching from a net exporter of wheat in 1958 to a net importer in
1972. We can focus on the relative importance of such a country in world23
trade without regard to whether it is an
1. Wheat
Gross world trade in wheat (imports
to 99.3 million metric tons between 1958
importer or an exporter.
plus exports) increased from 57.4
and 1972. Gross trade in wheat by
the centrally planned countries went from 10.2 to 13.4 million metric tons
or from 18 to 13 percent of gross world trade. Thus, the centrally planned
countries’ share of world trade in wheat actually declined. The big change
with respect to these countries was not so much in their total trade, but
in changes of the position of individual countries. The major changes were
China’s growing imports and the Soviet Union’s switch from being a signifi-
cant exporter in 1958 (4.9 million metric tons) to an importer in 1972 of
2.9 million metric tons.
The wheat trade monopolies of Canada, Australia, and Japan have
increased in importance. Their combined share of gross world trade in
wheat went from 21 percent in 1958 to 27 percent in 1972.
Taking these two groups of countries together, their total gross trade
in wheat increased from 22.5 to 39.9 million metric tons while their share
of world trade changed hardly at all--39 percent in 1958 compared with 40
percent in 1972. Thus, trade in wheat by the principal state trading
countries has not increased in relative importance. Yet, they account for
2 out of every 5 tons of wheat traded in world markets.
2. Coarse Grains
In the centrally planned countries all coarse grains are state traded.
Gross trade in coarse grains went from 2,()million metric tons in 1958 to
10.1 million metric tons in 1972 while the share of world trade went from
7 to 13 percent. During this period, Eastern Europe and China increased24
their imports of coarse grains significantly while the Soviet Union switched
from being an exporter to an importer.
12/ Canada’s and Australia’= share of gross world trade declined slightly
from 8 to 7 percent. While the Food Agency in Japan has a monopoly on
barley imports, we choose to ignore Japan in our calculation because of
the unimportance of barley in Japan’s total coarse grain imports in recent
years. Barley made up about 50 percent of coarse grain trade in 1958 but
dropped to 14 percent in 1972. In 1972, corn made up the bulk of Japan’s
trade in coarse grains and corn is not subject to state trading.
The amount of gross world trade in coarse grains accounted for by state
trading countries or those with trade monopolies increased rapidly as did
total world trade. The share of world trade covered by state trading in
the centrally planned countries, Canada and Australia increased modestly
from 15 percent in 1958 to 20 percent in 1972. Thus, unlike wheat, state
trading in coarse grains does appear to have increased somewhat in relative
importance. And the principal state trading nations account for one-fifth




planned countries represent the major state trading
Total gross trade accounted for by these countries went
from 1.8 million metric tons in 1958 to 4.2 million metric tons in 1972, or
from 18 to 29 percent of total gross world trade in rice. The large changes
that occurred within this group of countries were a 142-percent increase in
12/
— Data are for all coarse grains. While barley is the only coarse
grain which is state traded in Australia by the Australian Barley Board, it
constitutes nearly 80 percent of total coarse grain exports.25
rice exports by China and other Asia moving from a small export basis of
88 thousand metric tons in 1958 to significant importers of 1.0 million
metric tons in 1972.
111. Future World Grain Situation
A. Long-term Trends
Two studies,=’ one by FAO and one by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, project to 1985 world demand and supply of grains, by groups of
14/ countries.— These projections are summarized in tables 8 and 9. The
assumptions underlying both the FAO and USDA projections are contained in
the USDA study. The four alternatives represent the following scenarios:
Alternative I assumes that economic growth has been tem-
porarily slowed, but resumes strong wxpansion in the late 1970’s
and early 1980’s, However, under this alternative, continued
high internal prices limit expansion of world trade.
Alternative II is a high world import demand situation.
Under this alternative, income grows at a faster rate in both
the developing and developed countries than under Alternative I.
In addition, there is progress toward removing barriers to trade
in the developed world, and the centrally planned economies
increase their efforts to improve diets.
13/ — Reproduced in The World Food Conference: Selected Materials for
the Use of the U.S. Congressional Delegation to the World Food Conference,
Rome, Italy, November 5-16, 1974, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C., October 30, 1974; and The World
Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, Foreign Agricultural Economic
Report No. 98, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D. C., December 1974.
14/ — A recent study by the International Food Policy Research Institute,
Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World: The Location and Magnitude of
the Task in the Next Decade, views the future food import needs even more
pessimistically than the FAO or USDA studies, implying that the need to
accelerate growth of food production in the developing countries is even













































































Alternative III is a low demand situation that assumes
economic stagnation would continue in the late 1970’s and recov-
ery does not occur until the 1980’s.
Alternative IV reduces the developing countries’ import
needs by assuming that they increase their investments in food
production by embarking on a policy
inputs used to produce food.~/
There is a fairly close congruence
of increasing the bundle of
between the FAO and the USDA-II
projections with respect to the trade balances in grains for the different
types of countries. The trade balances are arrived at, however, by dif-





countries as a whole, the assumed rates of growth in production
are essentially the same
association results from
market economies and the
I?AOprojections assume a lower
for the developing market economies
under the FAO and USDA-II projections.
offsetting assumptions as between the
Asian centrally planned countries.
rate of growth in demand and production
and higher rates of growth in demand
and production for the Asian centrally planned economies than the USDA-II
alternative.
In both projections, grain imports by the developing countries are
projected to increase to over 75 million metric tons by 1985. In fact,
grain imports by the developing countries are projected to increase sub-
stantially under all the alternatives except USDA-IV, the latter alterna-
tive assuming that the rate of growth in grain
countries increases significantly between 1970
3.3 percent a year.
production in the developing
and 1985--from about 2.5 to
One point stands out very clearly: Unless the developing countries
15/ — The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, op. cit., p. 37.29
accelerate the rate of growth in their production of grains, they will
become increasingly dependent on grain supplies from the developed countries.
Furthermore, to the extent that the developing countries are unable to
finance rapidly expanding grain imports, growth in per capita supplies will
not keep pace with growth in demand, food prices will rise, and the nutri-
tional status of larger groups of people with little purchasing power will
probably declzne since they do not have the purchasing power to cope with
rising food prices.
B. Instability
There are basically two factors that account for most of the short-
term grain price instability in world markets. They are (a) fluctuations
in production due primarily to weather conditions, and (b) government poli-
cies that prevent many countries from sharing in consumption adjustments
to a price change.
Data on cereal production since 1955 for several regions of the world
are presented in figure 1. These data clearly show the magnitude of annual
variations in cereal production for the different regions. Most striking
are the large annual variations in the USSR. Entry of the USSR into world
grain trade on a regular basis introduces a degree of instability into
world markets which dwarfs the variations in cereal production one saw in
South Asia in 1965 and 1966 or were seen in any other region of the world.
A great deal of the annual fluctuations one observes in North America
resulted from conscious production control efforts, with the exception of
1970 when there was a sharp decline in corn production in the United States
due to the corn blight.

















Figure 1, Cereal Production in Major Regions of
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large fluctuations in grain production. The fluctuations have exerted
their influence on world grain prices.
There are basically three ways in which policies have contributed to
instability in world prices of agricultural products. They have reduced
the price elasticity of import demand or export supply relations, reduced
stocks of agricultural products, and changed suddenly the reliance of some
countries on world markets enough to affect the behavior of world market
prices. We are concerned with short-term movements in prices and will not
consider policies which result in longer-term secular or cyclical movements
in prices.
The way in which some countries have intervened in agricultural trade
has reduced the price elasticity of import demand and increased price
variability resulting from a given change in supplies on world markets.
Much of the intervention has been through the use of a variety of non-tariff
barriers that tend to make the import demand curve more price inelastic.
In the case of quotas or minimum import price schemes, such as the variable
levy system of the EEC, the import demand curve is perfectly price inelastic
over the range of prices (usually wide) for which these mechanisms are
c)perative.gi The increased price inelasticity of import demand relations
will add to instability in world prices of commodities unless there are
compensating increases in the price elasticity of the supply of exports.
Recent examples of temporary government interventions that kept domestic
prices below world prices and contributed to world market price instability
M&rtin ~ Abel
. 9 “Price Discrimination in the World Trade of
Agricultural Commodities,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 48, No. 2,
May 1966, pp. 194-208.33
are the export embargo on soybeans imposed by the United States in 1973 and
the variable export tax on grains and sugar used by the EEC in recent years.
The existence of substantial stocks of agricultural commodities can
help stabilize prices if they are used to achieve that end. The United
States worked diligently to reduce U.S. government-owned stocks of major
commodities, notably gra$ns. There has not been a compensatory increase in
privately held stocks. Since 1972, there have been insufficient stocks
to cushion the price swings that have resulted from variations in U.S.
production and foreign demand.
Policies to reestablish reserve stocks of grain were promoted at the
World Food Conference held in Nwember 1974. Little movement has occurred
in this area because ~f disagreements among countries as to who should
carry these stocks and how they are to be managed.
Another source of instability is the sudden shifts in food and agri-
cultural policies of countries that are large enough to significantly affect
world prices by their actions. The most recent and notable example of such
a shift was the change in the food and agricultural policies of the USSR
which thrust them upon the world market in a large and unpredictable way.
It is not the policy change yer se, but the suddenness of it which is
important. The formation of a common agricultural policy by the EEC repre-
sented a major agricultural policy change for a large trading bloc. How-
ever, this change occurred Sradually and in a predictable manner. Other
countries had time to adjust to the EEC actions, This was certainly not
the case with the Soviet Union in 1972.34
IV. Policies that Matter
A. Reasons for Different Types of Policies
A distinctive feature of food and agricultural policies around the
world is the close interrelationship between domestic and trade policies.
In fact, mechanisms for interfering with the flow of agricultural products
in international trade are usually an integral part of domestic agricultural
policies and programs. Many of these domestic efforts result in substantial
deviations between domestic and international prices of agricultural prod-
ucts l These price distortions bring about misallocation of resources that
contribute either positively or negatively to the total world supply of food
and its allocation among countries.
It is a legitimate activity of governments to implement social and
economic policies for the benefit of either agricultural producers or con-
sumers. Political pressures to do so have been historically strong and
likely will continue to be. It is naive to expect countries to follow a
laissez faire policy with respect to food and agriculture. What can be
hoped for is that countries will choose mechanisms for implementing their
policies that lead to improvement rather than deterioration in the global
food situation.
In general terms, the objectives of domestic agricultural policies
may be either to support farm prices and incomes above levels that would
prevail under free market conditions, or to maintain consumer prices of
food and fiber below free market levels. In market economies support to
producers is found predominantly in the developed countries and support to
nonfarm consumers in less developed countries.
In the industrialized countries the reasons for supporting agricultural.35
prices are basically twofold. One is to eliminate wide fluctuations in
prices which can result from relatively small shifts in very inelastic
supply and demand schedules for agricultural products. Another reason is
to deal with the low income problem in agriculture reflected by numerous
small producers with inadequate resources to generate earnings from farming
comparable to earnings in the nonfarm sector. (Some countries, such as
Norway and Sweden, have explicit policies of maintaining a certain propor-
tion of their population in agriculture or in certain rural areas.) The
tendency toward low incomes stems from the inability of resources to shift
rapidly enough from agriculture to other sectors of the economy. The
income problem is exacerbated when the agricultural sector is experiencing
rapid technological change, as in the United States during the 1950’s and
1960’s.
A typical response to the problem of low and unstable prices and
incomes is for governments to implement price support programs for major
commodities that maintain prices to farmers and consumers above equilibrium
levels. This was done in the United States in the 1950’s and currently
prevails in the European Community under its Common Agricultural Policy.
For a net exporting country it means the use of export subsidies to be
competitive in world markets. Even these subsidies (and substantial food
aid) did not prevent the accumulation of sizable surpluses. For importers
like the European Community it means protective barriers against imports
like the variable levy system (and export subsidies when exports are called
for). The combined effect of high price supports in both importing and
exporting countries is to increase domestic levels of production, reduce
consumption, and depress world market prices. The latter effect tends to36
reduce production in countries that compete at world prices; e.g., Canada
and Australia in the case of grains.
Less severe are agricultural policies which provide support to pro-
ducers but allow market prices to seek world levels. Consumption is not
reduced as a result of maintaining artificially high prices to consumers.
Production may or may not be stimulated, depending on whether the support
to producers is provided by price supports or by
a minimal effect on increasing production.
Experience has demonstrated that high price
income payments that have
supports will not in and
of themselves solve the problem of low incomes in agriculture. The income
problem will have to be dealt with by a combination of direct welfare
measures, assistance for resource adjustment, and expanded opportunities
for nonfarm employment. The disenchantment with the farm income main-
tenance characteristics of price support programs led the United States
17/ away from them in the 1960’s.— Proposals have also been made for the
European Community to find ways other than high price supports for dealing
18/ with the problem of low incomes in agriculture,— although as yet no
significant moves have been made in this direction.
The situation in many developing countries is quite different from
what one finds in industrialized nations. There is a strong desire in
many developing countries to keep the price of food to urban consumers
below world market levels. To the extent that this is accomplished,
17/ — U.S. Agriculture in a World Context: Policies and Approaches for
the Next Decade, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington,
D. C., July 24, 1973.
18/ — See A Future for European Agriculture, The Atlantic Papers No. 4,
The Atlantic Institute, Paris, 1970.37
producer prices are also depressed. This has been done with a variety of
mechanisms. Food exporting countries have used export tax mechanisms.
Examples where domestic prices to both consumers and producers have been
depressed below world market levels, and at times substantially below,
are rice in Thailand and wheat and corn in Argentina. Food importing
countries have used imports, which were sold at subsidized prices in domes-
tic markets, to keep domestic consumer and producer prices low. The direct
financial costs of such policies depend on the level of imports and their
unit costs. Food aid programs, such as P.L. 480, historically provided
developing countries with a cheap source of imports, and consequently, t-he
budgetary costs of maintaining low domestic food prices were not high. The
budgetary cost can be substantial when imports are obtained at world market
prices and the domestic subsidy is large. There are a great many countries
which have had cheap food policies. A few examples are Indonesia, India,
and Pakistan.
The general effect of low food price policies is to depress returns
to and discourage investments in agriculture, thus depressing the rate of
growth in output. At the same time, consumption is stimulated.
We now turn to a discussion of specific sets of policies which bear
directly on the current world food situation. The policy sets that will be
discussed are (1) policies that lead to underinvestment in technological
and resource development in many less developed countries; (2) trade and
price policies in less developed countries that discourage the adoption of
known technologies and the use of modern inputs; (3) protectionistic policies
in the developed countries that depress world market prices and limit export
markets for less developed countries; (4) policies that contribute to the38
instability of world
programs designed to
prices; and (5) national and international development
increase food production in developing countries.
B. Underinvestment in Agriculture
It is no great secret that many countries, particularly the less
developed ones, do not assign high priority to agricultural development.
This is true even when the bulk of their gross domestic product comes
from agriculture and a high proportion of the population is employed in
agriculture. To the extent that any development is emphasized, it is
generally industrial development that is emphasized and not agricultural
development.
19/
In a study of 26 selected developing countries-- for the period
1958-63, only 12 had compound rates of growth in agricultural output of
4 percent a year or more. Of the remaining 14 countries, 5 had rates of
growth of agricultural output lower than those for population. The study
concludes that:
Rapid rates of increase in crop output have not happened
as a consequence of normal economic and social processes in socie-
ties organized on a laissez-faire basis. Rather, they have been
undergirded by aggressive group action, generally national in
scope, directed specifically to improving agricultural production
conditions. (p. v)
Behind the overall picture of a relative lack of interest in agricul-
tural development are numerous details. Two very important components of
more rapid growth in agricultural output are the development of land and
water resources and the development of new technology. With the exception
19/ — Changes in Agriculture in 26 Developing Countries, 1948-63, Foreign
Agricultural Economic Report No. 27, Economic Research Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., November 1965.39
of countries that have been able to exploit large amounts of unused land,
rates of growth in agricultural output are closely related to rates of
resource development and the capacity to generate new technology. (of
course, other aspects, such as infrastructure markets, credit, and price
policies, are also important.) In a comprehensive study of agriculture in
Asia,z/ these two areas receive high priority. Countries whose progress
in agricultural development has been rapid, such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan,
Israel, etc., have placed heavy emphasis on land and water resource develop-
ment and on technological change.
c* Trade and Price Policies
Trade and price policies that shift the terms of trade against the
agricultural sector discourage the use of known technology and modern
production inputs as well as retard longer-term investments in resource
and technological development. Policies repressive to the agricultural
sector are widespread among developing countries. Little, !Scitorsky, and
Scott conclude, “the bias has been excessive: that in several of the
countries [studied] the effect on agricultural production hi~sbeen damag-
ing, and that agricultural exports earned less than they should have done
,,21/ in most of the countries. —
Several studies deal with the strong effect that trade and price
policies have on the adoption of new technology and the use of modern
20/ —Asian Agricultural Survey, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philip-
pines, 1969. For an excellent discussion of the importance of new technology,
see Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An
International Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Prees, 1971).
21/ — Ian Little, Tibor Scitorsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in
Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Pre~ 1970), p. 178.40
inputs. The results of some of these are worth summarizing.
22/
Ardila, Hertford, Rocha, and Trujillo--- concluded that the slow rate
of adoption of improved varieties of wheat in Colombia was the result of
low domestic prices resulting from substantial imports of wheat under the
P.L. 480 program, 23/ De Janvry’s study-- of the use of fertilizer in cereal
production in Argentina concludes that high fertilizer prices resulting
from import tariffs and restrictions that protect a monopolistic and
technologically obsolete fertilizer industry greatly inhibit its use. The
development of new technologies to increase grain yields based on fertilizer
are also retarded. He concludes that Argentina “is losing its international
comparative advantages which have been resource based by not participating
in the Green Revolution when it could in fact be one of the greatest bene-
ficiaries.” A final example is rice production in Thailand where the com-
bination of an export tax on rice and a highly protected domestic fertilizer
industry have made expanded use of fertilizer unprofitable and resulted in
a lower level of rice production and exports than would have prevailed under
24/
product and factor prices approaching international levels.— These exam-
ples should serve to illustrate that
“Jorge Ardila, Reed Hertford,
“Returns to Agricultural Research in
unfavorable trade and price policies
Andres Rocha, and Carlos Trujillo,
Colombia,” paper presented at the
Conference on Resource Allocation and Productivity in International
Agricultural Research, Airlie House, Virginia, January 26-29, 1975.
~/Alain De Janvry, “Optimal Levels of Fertilization under Risk: The
Potential for Corn and Wheat Fertilization under Alternative Price Policies
in Argentina,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, No, 1,
February 1972, pp. 1-10,
24/ — Delane E. Welsch and Sopin Tongpan, “Background to the Introduction
of High Yielding Varieties of Rice in Thailand,” Staff Paper P72-6,
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota,
St. Paul, Minnesota, February 1972.41
in many less developed countries retard growth in agricultural production
and contribute to a world food situation characterized by strong demand
relative to supply and high prices.
D. Development Assistance Programs
Since World War 11, the development assistance programs of national
governments, international agencies, and private organizaticms have had a
major impact on the world food and population scene. These programs have
been directed at improving living conditions in the less developed countries
by promoting economic growth, increasing agricultural output.,reducing death
rates, reducing rates of population growth, and improving the distribution
of income and wealth.
The numerous development assistance efforts have had uneven rates of
success in achieving all of these objectives in all developing countries.
Some countries were either unreceptive to outside assistants or used it
inefficiently. At times the development assistance programs of some
countries and some international organizations, aided and abetted by national
policies in recipient countries, were directed toward activities that contrib-
uted little to improving the food situation in developing countries, e.g.,
military assistance, heavy emphasis on industrialization and the neglect
of agricultural development, and rapid reduction of death ri~tes,which
resulted in a population explosion. And, development assistance programs
did not always recognize the complexity of the problems which they were
trying to solve.
Few would deny, however, that the development assistance programs of
the last 30 years were a grand and noble effort that improved the lives of
countless millions of people in the less developed world. Per capita food42
supplies have been increased through the development and adoption of better
farming practices; increasing the yield potential of crops and livestock;
expanding irrigated area and reclaiming land; increasing the availability
of modern agricultural inputs; and bringing more and more people into the
process of agricultural modernization through extension efforts, development
of transportation and marketing facilities, etc. Health conditions have
been improved through the reduction or elimination of ravaging diseases
and increasing the availability of medical services. Education levels have
been increased substantially, particularly with respect to skills required
for development. Institutional capacity has been built so that many coun-
tries are better able to deal with the~r development problems. And, we
have learned a great deal about the complexity of the issues involved and
how to deal with them; e.g., we have learned that agricultural technology
cannot be effectively transferred from developed to developing countries
but must be developed to fit the ecological, factor, and cultural endowments
of the developing countries; that land reform is easier to write about than
to actually achieve; that problems of income distribution and poverty are
strongly rooted in political and cultural characteristics of nations; that
changing economic policies has its opponents as well as its proponents; and
that changing these and other aspects of societies and economies is a slow,
difficult process requiring wise and sustained efforts.
The capacity to assist developing countries is greater than it has
ever been. The collective talents and resources involved in national
development assistance programs, the World Bank, the regional development
banks, the various United Nations development agencies, and private organiza-
tions is substantial. And, increasingly, the priorities of these various organi-
zations is shifting toward solving problems of food, agriculture, population,43
and income distribution. These efforts can yield substantial improvements
in the world food situation if they are sustained, if developing countries
cooperate in realigning their policies to improve the efficiency and pro-
ductivity of development assistance resources, and if other countries refrain
from following policies that lead to immiseration in the developing regions
of the world--such as unduly high prices of petroleum and overly restrictive
trade practices.
E. The Net Effect of Policies
What can we say about the net effect on the current world food situa-
tion of all the policies discussed? It is doubtful that one can make precise
quantitative estimates of the effect of policies on the level of world food
production, its distribution among and within nations, and the stability of
production, prices, and trade flows. However, some judgments can be made
about the direction of the effec~s of different policies on the world food
situation.
The first judgment is that a great many developing countries are not
producing nearly as much food as they could. Partly this is due to their
own policies, some which lead to a neglect of investments in the agricultural
sector--research, extension, infrastructure, development of soil and water
resources, etc., and some which shift the terms of trade against the agri-
cultural sector. Consequently, known ways to increase productivity and
output are not adopted and there is little incentive to develop new sources
of productivity growth. It is also true that the restrictive trade policies
of the developed countries create distortions in world market prices which
generally reduce prices of agricultural products (and other primary and
labor-intensive manufactured products as well) and the incentives to increase44
output in the developing countries. There are a sufficient number of develop-
ing countries representing a wide range of resource endowments that have
emphasized agricultural development and have made notable strides in increas-
ing agricultural output to support our judgment that more can be done to
increase agricultural production in other developing countries.
It is less clear what the net effect on world food supplies would be
if the developed countries followed agricultural policies that resulted in
less distortion of world market prices. Movement of more of the developed
countries toward policies that meet income and social objectives without
maintaining excessive resources in agricultural production would undoubtedly
lead to lower levels or rates of growth of production in many importing
countries and to higher levels of production in many exporting countries.
But it is not clear if “rationalization” of agricultural policies among
the developed countries will lead to greater, less, or about the same level
of total production among these countries or to lower, higher~ or about the
same levels of world market prices for various commodities. We do not yet
have an adequate empirical base for drawing unambiguous conclusions about
the effects of agricultural policy liberalization in the developed countries.
Much could be done by the developed countries, and the less developed
ones as well, to reduce short-term price instability in world markets. One
step would be the establishment of reserves for major commodities, such as
grains, managed in ways that maintain price fluctuations within certain
bounds. The World Food Conference proposed establishment of an international
reserve for grains. Many countries, especially the United States, are wary
of international efforts. They fear that international reserves will be
managed in ways contrary to national policy interests. An alternative might45
be for several of the major producing and consuming nations--U.S., Canada,
Australia, Japan, EEC(9), USSR, and PRC--to maintain reserves and informally
coordinate their management. This approach might circumvent some issues
related to loss of national sovereignty.
Other steps that could be taken to lessen short-run price instability
in world markets center on the redesign of national agricultural policies
that increase the price elasticity of export supply and import demand. The
price effects of short-term fluctuations in demand or supply would be shared
by a larger number of countries and would be less concentrated on policy-
restricted world markets.
Countries which engage in major changes in food and agricultural
policies should be encouraged to do so on an orderly basis, giving markets
and policies in other countries time to adjust in a nondisruptive fashion.
Finally, development assistance activities will have to be accelerated
and focused more sharply on food, agriculture, population, and income distri-
bution problems. Ways will have to be found to achieve closer coordination
between national development priorities and foreign development assistance
efforts in order to improve the effectiveness of such assistance. The
difficult and long-term nature of agricultural and economic development
should be more widely recognized and incorporated into development assistance
programs of national governments and international agencies.
v. Policy Options
In this section we will focus attention on some of the policy options
which may be open to countries individually and collectively. We will dis-
tinguish between those policies related to long-run supply-demand balances46
in the world and those concerning short-run variability in production,
consumption, and prices about the long-run trends. Also, we will distinguish
among different types of countries-- namely, developed grain exporters, devel-
oped grain importers, less developed grain exporters and less developed grain
importers. There may be either competitive or complementary interests among
different types of countries with respect to individual policy issues. It
may not always be possible to reach widespread, let alone global, agreement
on specific issues.
A. Increasing Production
There is broad-based agreement that long-term improvements in the world
food situation require more rap$d increases in per capita grain production
in the less developed countries, particularly in many of the grain importing
ones. To achieve this objective will require combined efforts to (a) slow
the rate of population growth, and (b) increase the growth rate of total
food production. Continued increases in per capita grain production in the
developed countries will also be required, but this in itself will not be
enough to meet the rapidly grow~ng food needs of the developing countries.
A recent study by the International Food Policy Research Institute
summarizes the future food demand-supply prospects.
Unless the trend of production in the DME [DevelopingMarket
Economies] countries improves in the future, production of cereals,
the major food in most developing countries, will fall short of
meeting food demand in food deficit countries by 95-108 million
tons in 1985/86 depending on the rate of economic growth. This
compares with shortfalls of 45 million tons in the food crisis
year, 1974/75, and an average of 28 million tons in the relatively
good production period, 1969/71. Asia accounts for some 50 percent
of the total projected deficits, North Africa/Middle East about
20 percent, and Sub-Sahara Africa and Latin America about 15 per-
cent each.47
A total cereal deficit of about 100 million tons in DME
food deficit countries could well prove conservative. It iS
based on projection of the production trend of 1960-74, an
average increase of 2.5 percent a year, to 1985. During the
last half of that period, 1967-74, the rate has slowed to 1.7
percent. This is too short a period and subject to too much
variation from year to year to serve as a reliable base for
projecting the future. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of
the slackening in production for all regions and cereal crops
(except for wheat in Asia, the most visible evidence of the
“Green Revolution”) suggests that it may well be difficult
for DME food deficit countries to maintain their longer term
production trends. In the event performance in the future
reflects the more recent trend, cereal production could fall
short an additional 100 million tons. Such a large transfer
of food, largely from developed countries, could well be
unmanageable physically or financially. ~/
There are basically two policy directions which have to be pursued
vigorously to bring about improvement in the per capita world food situa-
tion, particularly in the less developed grain importing countries. One
is for national and international agencies providing development assistance
to less developed countries to place even higher priority on agricultural
development. The other is for many developing countries to devote more
resources to agricultural development.
Evidence indicates that food production and agricultural development
have received Increasing attention in foreign aid efforts in recent years.
International leading agencies have strongly emphasized agricultural
development. There has been a marked expansion of international agricul-
tural research as demonstrated by the rapid expansion of activities in
international agricultural research efforts. And, the foreign assistance
activities of the United States have given high priority to food and
25/ —Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World: The Location and
Magnitude of the Task in the Next Decade, Research Report No. 1, Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D. C., February 1976,
P. 2*48
population problems. High priority for food and agriculture in develop-
ment assistance efforts will have to be continued for many years since
long-run trends in food production can only be changed slowly and as a
result of intensive and sustained effort.
The effectiveness of assistance to the less developed countries to
increase food production and achieve agricultural development is condi-
tioned by the efforts that the developing countries themselves make.
Developing countries that follow policies and programs conducive to agri-
cultural development, will, in general, benefit more from outside assis-
tance than those who do not. Thus, it is important for many developing
countries to reorder their development priorities more in favor of agri-
cultural development.
The need to intensify agricultural development efforts arises not
only because the demand for food is growing rapidly, but also because
future gains in production will be harder to achieve. This is so for
several reasons.
First, most of the world’s land that could easily and inexpensively
be brought into production is now being utilized, Additional land can
be used only at sharply increased social and private costs. This addi-
tional land currently has low productivity. High product prices will be
required over a long period of time to make the use of marginal lands
profitable; i.e., to generate an adequate return for the use of land with
low productivity or to pay for large investments in drainage, land reclama-
26/ tion, etc. required to increase the productivity of marginal lands.—
26/
— Another cost is increased soil erosion as more and more marginal
land is brought into production. These costs manifest themselves through
the loss of top soil and, therefore, soil productivity, siltation of irri-
gation systems and navigable waterways, and increased incidence of flooding.49
Second, expansion of irrigated area will also come at progressively
higher costs. Many of the easily developed irrigation sites have been
utilized. Additional irrigation systems can be built only at progressively
higher costs. However, improving the productivity of existing systems may
be highly profitable,”’
Third, energy costs are
years ahead. The direct and
likely to remain
indirect effects
high and even increase in the
of high energy costs will be
to raise agricultural production costs.
The list of things to do in individual countries is relatively well
known. It includes such items as less distorted price and trade policies,
more attention to agricultural research and extension, development of land
and water resources, improvements in marketing and transportation infrastruc-
ture, improving the availability and price of basic production inputs, etc.
Of course, it is much easier to develop a list of general prescriptions than
to develop workable policies and programs in specific country situations.
Nevertheless, the latter desperately needs doing, as the numbers concerning
the future food situation indicate.
All this does not mean that each and every country should pursue blindly
the objective of self-sufficiency in food. What is a reasonable agricultural
development effort
country’s resource
to the rest of the
in any particular country can be judged in light of that
endowments and agricultural production potential relative
economy, and its perceived comparative advantage in a world
market context. Overemphasis on agricultural production can be just as costly
to a nation as an equivalent amount of neglect.
A reordering of development priorities in less developed grain exporting
countries as well as developed countries (both grain importers and exporters)
27/ — See K. William Easter, “Field Channels: A Key to Better Indian
Irrigation,” Water Resources Research, Vol. 11, No. 3, June 1975.50
is also called for. As discussed earlier, there
larly less developed grain exporters, that could
duction if they followed policies more favorable
are several nations, particu-
substantially increase pro-
to their agricultural sectors.
Positive actions on their part would contribute to increasing the total world
food supply and lowering prices of grain in world markets.
And there are many who argue that many developed countries are not
paying sufficient attention to increasing their own output. They argue that
even in the United States, a showcase of agricultural productivity growth,
28/
expenditures on agricultural research have been declining in real terms.—
There arises inevitably a conflict between the interests of exporters and
importers. The former would, in general, prefer “high” world market prices
while the latter group would prefer “low” world prices, If we were dealing
with a long-term outlook that indicated an overabundance of production and
depressed world prices, fihenthe concerns of exporting countries about expan-
ded, competitive production in other countries would carry some credence.
But if that were the prognosis, we would not be nearly as concerned about the
future world food situation. Rather, we are faced with large shortages, or,
put differently, high world food prices. In such a world, achieving lower
world food prices should be welcomed generally and tolerated considerably
29/ well by exporting countries.—
B, Grain Reserves
As discussed earlier, there is considerable year-to-year variation in
28/ — See for example, Agricultural Production Efficiency, National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C., 1975, and World Food and Nutrition
Study: Enhancement of Food Production for the United States, Report of the
Board of Agriculture and Renewable Resources, National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D. C., 1975.
~’This does not mean that governments of food grain exporting countries
would not get a considerable amount of political heat from their producers.51
grain production in many parts of the world, especially the Soviet Union
and South Asia. If these variations are allowed to influence world markets,
they can cause considerable variation in grain prices because of the price
inelasticity of the demand for grain.
World market price instability can be reduced if there exist reserve
stocks of grains that are managed in ways designed to reduce price insta-
bility.g’ The topic of grain reserves has received a lot of attention in
both national and international circles. As an outgrowth of the World
Food Conference in 1974, the possibility of establishing an international
grain reserve is being discussed.
The importance of maintaining a
ity in grains is important to almost
reasonable degree of world price stabil-
all nations. For developed countries,
wildly fluctuating grain prices can be an important source of general price
instability. And, this instability can be inflationary to the extent that
fluctuating grain prices have an asymmetric effect on the general price
level, i.e., rising grain prices contribute to increases in wages and non-
food prices, but falling grain prices do not lead to reductions in wages and
nonfood prices, thus exerting a ratchet effect on the general price level.
For developing countries, wide fluctuations in world grain prices
introduce two types of hardships. First, both exporting and importing
countries are faced with destabilization of foreign exchange available for
imports of nonagricultural goods--grain importers through fluctuations in
expenditures on grain imports and exporters through fluctuation in foreign
“There are other measures which can also reduce price instability.
One is for countries to follow less insular agricultural policies and for
the consumption adjustments to price changes to be spread over more countries.52
exchange earnings. Thus, developing countries are faced
concerning availability of funds to finance development.
numbers of the poorer segments of the population in some





tries cannot import sufficient grain because high world prices exhaust
foreign exchange reserves and food aid efforts are inadequate.
Cochrane and Danln,z’ n an excellent study of the grain reserve
issue> point out that (a) the quantity of grain required to keep world
prices within a reasonable range of variation during most years would not
be excessive, but (b) achieving agreement as to appropriate principles for
managing grain reserves would not be easy.
There are two types of problems associated with the establishmentof
grain reserves to stabillze price. One has to do with obtaining a con-
sensus that reserves are desirable. As Cochrane and Danin point out:
The grain reserve issue 1s a thorny issue. This is true
both within countries and among countries. Producer interests
currently are wary of pr~ce stabilizing schemes and are reluctant
to consider them seriously unless they involve price floors but
no ceilings. Consumer interests, on the other hand, currently
seek stable grain and food prices and are anxious to implement
reserve stock programs to achieve stable grain prices at levels
that seem reasonable to them. Consumers tend to believe, and
perhaps rightly in these days of resource scarcity, that they
have much to gain from the stabilization of producer prices.
Whether these opposing ~nterests can be reconciled in an effec-
tive International grain reserve stock program remains to be
seen. But if they are reconciled and if an effective inter-
national reserve stock program is brought into being, it will
occur only because of extraordinarilywise and strong leader-
ship on the part of one, or a few, key tradln
5/
nations (for exam-
ple, the United States) in the world market. <
---
31/ — Willard W. Cochrane and Yigal Danin, Reserve Stock Grain Models:
The World and the United States, 1975-85, Technical Bulletin No. 305,
Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Minnesota, 1976.
~/ibid
—“ ~ p. 3.53
But if there is the political will to establish grain reserves, there
remains the problem of how to get agreement on principles for managing
reserves so that the reserve program remains viable. Since one is con-
cerned about stabilization of prices about some trend, wherever that trend
might go, one has to reach agreement on measuring the trend in grain prices.
Further, agreement will have to be reached on the degree to which prices
are allowed to fluctuate about the trend. The more one constrains the
degree of price variability, the larger the quantity of reserve stocks
required and the greater the cost. It will not be easy to obtain broad
agreement on these issues. Yet, experience has shown that price stabiliza-
tion schemes without explicit pricing rules are likely to fail.
c. Market Information and Transactions
In the absence of effective grain reserve and world market price
stabilization schemes, one is inevitably faced with the question of how
best to live with price instability. Accurate and timely information about
current and future supplies, demands, and prices of grains becomes impor-
tant for countries to operate in world markets at minimum costs. Timely
and accurate information on the world grain situation is inadequate. This
is so because (a) many countries have poor information systems and do not
know with any reasonable degree of accuracy what their current domestic
food situation is like, and (b) some countries are reluctant to share infor-
mation about their current food situation with other nations. Strenuous
efforts should be made to improve national and international information
systems as an important step towards coping with instability in world grain
markets.=/ This is especially important for many less developed countries
33/ —-For discussions of this point, see Martin E. Abel, Food, Agriculture,54
who have poor domestic food information systems and less experience than
many developed countries in operating in commercial world grain markets.
Another alternative for coping with price instabilitymight be the use
of long-term contractual arrangements among countries for the purchase or
sale of grain. Countries could contract for at least some portion of their
future grain import needs. This would provide a certain degree of assur-
ance to both importers and exporters about the availability of import sup-
plies and export markets, respectively. But since future grain needs or
world market conditions cannot be predicted with accuracy, there could be
a significant cost associated with long-term contractual arrangements. One
or more of the contracting parties might be worse off financially than under




supply of or market for grains against the cost of such arrange-
issue concerning long-term contractual grain sales or purchase
agreements concerns their distribution among countries. Such arrangements
do not automatically ensure that countries have equal access to world grain
supplies. Those countr~es with contractual arrangementsmay be in a position
to preempt grain supplies and leave other countries without effective access
to world grain markets, especially in years of global shortages. This is an
(footnote 33/ continued) —
and Nutrition Information Systems_, presented to the Office of Technology
Assessment Board, Congress of the United States, February 4, 1976; Food,
Agriculture and Nutrition Information Systems: Assessment and Recommendations,
Report of the Food Advisory Committee, Congress of the United States, June
1975; Dale l%.Hathaway, A Statement of World Food Information Systems: Progress ——
and Problems, presented to the Technology Assessment Board, Congress of the
United States, September 24, 1975; and Howard W. Hjort, World Agricultural
Information System: A Critical Evaluation, a report submitted to the Office
of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, September 1975.55
important consideration for developing countries if the distribution of
contractual arrangements favors grain trade among the developed countries.
D. Financial Considerations
We have already discussed the effects of unstable world grain prices
on export earnings or import expenditures, especially for the poorer coun-
tries. Many less developed grain importing countries are faced with chronic
shortages of foreign exchange made worse in times of extremely high world
grain prices. These problems are mitigated by the flow of financial and
food aid to them. However, the flow of aid is never enough and is espec-
ially constraining in periods of high world prices.
The financial constraints faced by many developing countries results of
an imbalance of food purchasing power among rich and poor nations in favor
of the rich ones. An inevitable result is that in periods of grain (and
other basic commodity) shortages the rich countries bid available supplies
away from the poor ones.
Consideration should be given to mechanisms to rectify this imbalance
of purchasing power. A partial alternative (or supplement) to world grain
reserves might be a world food fund which would provide poor grain importing
countries with compensatory financial assistance with which to maintain food
imports in periods of sharply rising prices. Under this approach, food
purchasing power rather than food yer se is redistributed from rich to poor
countries. Such a redistributive mechanism would attempt to maintain some
form of food purchasing price parity among nations in unstable world markets.
It is a mechanism under which rich countries would share scarce food sup-
plies with poor countries.
As with all specific redistributive schemes, a world food fund would56
face many difficulties in its establishmentand operation. It is a form
of aid and the aid-weary developed nations would probably be reluctant to




very difficult to tie such assistance to food purchases. After
countries with foreign exchange constraints are short of money




assistance for food imports from “leaking” into pur-
items.
remains that an imbalance of food purchasing power between
rich and poor nations results in an unbalanced distribution of world food
supplies. Unless something is done to redress this imbalancemore in favor
of the poor countries, they will continue to come up short in periods of
tight world food supplies and high prices.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has presented a global characterizationof the world market
situation for grains as it now exists and as it is likely to exist over
the next five to ten years. It is difficult to make specific global recom-
mendations for how to deal with the problems inherent in the world grain
situation. The interests of individual countries vary widely. Each
country will have to assess its
to improve its situation.
Until significant progress
and increase the growth rate of
likely to be high and unstable.
own interests and pursue courses of action
has been made to build grain reserve stocks
food production, world grain prices are
A corollary to the high price situation IS
that increases in agricultural production based on conventional inputs such
as land, water and fertilizer will be more costly In the future than they57
have been in the past. It would be prudent for each country to evaluate
its agricultural policies and development strategies in terms of these
conditions.
The returns to increasing agricultural production, particularly in the
developing countries, should be quite high in most instances. Reformulation
of agricultural and investment policies to be more conducive to growth in
agricultural output would be a major step toward dealing with a tight world
food situation. In many countries, the policy thrust should be primarily
in the direction of improving output per hectare since expansion of agri-
cultural area will be difficult and costly. Greater emphasis will have to
be given to developing indigenous research capability, to increasing the
efficiency of land and water use, and to building institutions that foster
rapid adoption of modern agricultural technology and inputs. Expanded
emphasis on agricultural development is relevant for both food importing
and exporting countries. Importers would reduce their food import costs
while exporters would capitalize on strong world market conditions.
Efforts on the part of developing countries to reform policies and
stimulate agricultural development should be supported strongly by national
and international development assistance programs. Also, it is in the
interest of developed and developing countries to liberalize trade. Such
liberalization would provide developing countries with an important source
of revenue and strength incentives to expand agricultural production. The
developed countries could benefit from improved utilization of their
reserves as well as more bouyant markets for their products in developing
countries.
There are several actions that countries will have to take in order
to better cope with world grain price instability or its causes. First,58
both national and internationalefforts to build and manage grain reserves
are essential if world gram prices are to be contained within some reason-
able range. Countries should evaluate the combination of national and
international grain reserves and management rules that best meet their needs,
In spite of differences in country interests and the difficulties involved
in establishing and managing grain reserves, one thing is clear: It Will
be impossible to avoid wide swings in world grain prices without adequate
grain reserves.
Second, countries should pay more attention to developing better
agricultural information systems both nationally and Internationallyas
a way to cope with an uncertain world market. It is especially important
for developing countries to have accurate and timely estimates of their
own food production in order to determine either import needs or export
availabilities. It is also important for world markets to have similar
information in order to assess accurately future price levels, needs of
various countries, and the distribution of grain supplies among countries
on commercial and noncommercial terms.
An uncertain world grain market means an uncertain financial situation
for most countries, particularly developing countries. Attention should
be paid to development of mechanisms that contribute to stabilizing the
food purchasing power of poor countries. There would then be a better
alignment between food needs and the ability to meet these needs from
world markets.